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INTRODUCTION
N her delightful and provocative essay, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge 
v. Ford,1 Professor Lynn Stout manages simultaneously to make too much 
and too little of the famous decision thwarting Henry Ford’s apparent effort 
to steer the powerful automobile company he controlled away from the 
pursuit of profit maximization as the single-minded purpose of the 
corporation. 
Professor Stout makes too much of the case when she asserts that 
“[m]uch of the credit, or perhaps more accurately the blame, for this state of 
affairs can be laid at the door of . . . the 1919 Michigan Supreme Court 
decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Company.”2 This is wrong, since the Michigan 
† Deputy Dean and Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and 
Securities Law, Yale Law School. 
1. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. BUS. REV. 163 (2008). 
2. Id. at 164 (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)). 
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Supreme Court is merely the messenger here. As Professor Stout rightly 
points out, the Michigan Supreme Court has not innovated much in the world 
of corporate governance,3 and this case is no exception. The court certainly 
cannot rightly be credited (or, if Professor Stout is to be believed, blamed) for 
inventing the idea that the purpose of the public corporation is to maximize 
value for shareholders.  
Professor Stout makes too little of the case with her claim that the 
opinion is “a mistake, a judicial ‘sport,’ a doctrinal oddity largely irrelevant to 
corporate law and practice.”4 The case is not a doctrinal oddity. Dodge v. Ford
still has legal effect, and is an accurate statement of the form, if not the 
substance, of the current law that describes the fundamental purpose of the 
corporation. By way of illustration, the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) 
Principles of Corporate Governance (“Principles”),5 considered a significant, if not 
controlling, source of doctrinal authority, are consistent with Dodge v. Ford’s 
core lesson that corporate officers and directors have a duty to manage the 
corporation for the purpose of maximizing profits for the benefit of 
shareholders. Specifically, section 2.01 of the Principles makes clear that “a 
corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities 
with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”6
Significantly, the Principles specify that the goal of the corporation is 
shareholder wealth maximization. According to Professor Mel Eisenberg, 
Reporter for the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 
shareholder wealth maximization is used because “the market is usually more 
accurate” and is less susceptible to manipulation than other measures of 
corporate performance.7 Moreover, the ALI expressly emphasizes 
shareholder wealth rather than corporate wealth, and specifically excludes 
labor interests as something that should be maximized, contrary to Professor 
Stout’s apparent preferences on this matter.8
The Principles contain only three rather minor exceptions to the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm. Corporations can ignore shareholder 
wealth maximization in order to: (1) comply with the law; (2) make charitable 
3. Id. at 167 (citing Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation 
Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 
(2002)).  
4. Id. at 166. 
5. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
6. Id. § 2.01. 
7. Symposium, Waseda Institute for Corporation Law and Society, A Talk with Professor 
Eisenberg 21, http://www.21coe-win-cls.org/english/activity/Eisenberg_e.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2008). 
8. See id. 
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contributions; and (3) devote a “reasonable amount of resources to public 
welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.”9 In other 
words, the only exceptions permitted to the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm are those necessary to ensure that corporations be given sufficient 
latitude to act like responsible community members by complying with the 
law and supporting charities and other worthy causes.  
Professor Stout makes the observation that “[a] large majority of state 
[corporation] codes contain so-called other-constituency provisions that 
explicitly authorize corporate boards to consider the interests of not just 
shareholders, but also employees, customers, creditors, and the community, in 
making business decisions.”10 Professor Stout makes much too much of this 
corporate governance factoid. For the sake of completeness, she should have 
pointed out that these statutes cannot rationally be construed to permit 
managers to benefit non-shareholder constituencies at the expense of 
shareholders. Rather, these statutes are mere tie-breakers, allowing managers 
to take the interests of non-shareholder constituencies into account when 
doing so does not harm shareholders in any demonstrable way.  
In this Essay, first I will examine in a bit more detail Professor Stout’s 
claim that corporations have some purpose other than profit maximization. 
Next, I will argue that though she is wrong on the legal doctrine, her 
argument contains only a minor, essentially semantic error that reflects a 
modest bit of confusion about the legal landscape. 
Nevertheless, Professor Stout’s excellent essay captures two very 
important points about corporate law. First, because the corporation is a 
contract-based form of business organization, maximizing shareholder gain is 
only a default rule. Shareholders could opt out of this goal if they so desired. 
Shareholders, however, have indicated very little, if any, propensity to alter 
the application of the default rule that the public companies in which they 
invest should do strive to maximize profits on their behalf.
The second important point captured by Professor Stout’s essay is that 
Dodge v. Ford is interesting not because it establishes the proposition that 
directors should maximize shareholder wealth as a matter of law, but rather as 
“a normative discourse on what many believe the proper purpose of a well-
functioning corporation should be.”11 This observation is meaningful and 
important, but incomplete. Professor Stout’s assertion that Dodge v. Ford is a 
mere normative description of what corporate law ought to be, rather than a 
9. PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 2.01. 
10. Stout, supra note 1, at 169. 
11. Id. at 173. 
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positive account of what corporate law actually is, does not account for the 
inconvenient fact that the shareholder maximization ideal actually drives the 
holding and is not mere dicta.  
Still, Professor Stout invokes an extremely important truth: there are no 
cases other than Dodge v. Ford that actually operationalize the rule that 
corporations must maximize profits. The goal of profit maximization is to 
corporate law what observations about the weather are in ordinary 
conversation. Everybody talks about it, including judges, but with the lone 
exception of Dodge v. Ford, nobody actually does anything about it.  
Next, I will expound on the implications of the fact that shareholder 
wealth maximization is widely accepted at the level of rhetoric but largely 
ignored as a matter of policy implementation. In the following section, I will 
explain why Dodge v. Ford is generally ignored. I will then discuss what I 
believe is the most interesting aspect of Dodge v. Ford: the implications of the 
case from an ethical perspective. Here, I will make the radical and irreverent 
assertion that the reason we have never seen, and in all probability will never 
see, another case quite like Dodge v. Ford is because CEOs who testify in 
depositions and trials are better coached and more willing to dissemble than 
Henry Ford was. If other CEOs actually told the truth about how they put 
their own private interests ahead of those of the shareholders, the case might 
not stand in such splendid isolation. 
In the final section, I will take issue with Professor Stout’s assertion that 
advances in economic thinking have made it clear that shareholders are not 
the sole residual claimants in the firm, as well as its implication that corporate 
managers should be free to maximize the wealth of all of the corporation’s 
constituencies and not just the wealth of the shareholders.  
I. WHY NOBODY DOES ANYTHING ABOUT DODGE V. FORD
Maximizing value for shareholders is difficult to do. There is no simple 
algorithm, formula, or rule that managers can employ to determine what 
corporate strategy will maximize returns for shareholders. Competition is fierce. 
The world changes quickly. Even extremely dedicated and able managers 
preside over business ventures that fail. A strategy that leads to great success in 
one venture may result in financial catastrophe in another venture. The world 
of business is more than uncertain: it is chaotic and unpredictable.  
Thus even though I believe, contrary to Professor Stout, that corporate 
law requires directors to maximize shareholder value, I also recognize that it 
simply is not possible or practical for courts to discern ex post when a 
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company is maximizing value for shareholders and when the officers and 
directors are only pretending to do so.  
Shareholder wealth maximization, however, is still at least the law on the 
books, if not in practice. It is the law, just as it is the law that cars should not 
drive more than fifty-five miles per hour on Connecticut’s Merritt Parkway. 
The speed limit is clearly posted and well understood. In reality, however, it is 
extremely rare to locate a car traveling at less than seventy miles per hour, and 
eighty miles per hour is closer to the norm. I presume that Professor Stout 
would agree with me about what the law says with respect to the speed limit 
on the Merritt Parkway.  
The lack of any apparent means to enforce the de jure speed limit on the 
Merritt Parkway is largely due to the fact that the terrain makes it extremely 
difficult to set up speed traps. This, in turn, makes it difficult for the police to 
detect wrongdoing. The same is true for the rule of corporate law that 
corporate fiduciaries are obligated to maximize profits for shareholders. The 
law is clear. It is not merely a “normative discourse,” as Professor Stout 
argues.12 The problem is not the lack of clarity of the rule. The problem is 
lack of enforceability. 
The enforceability problem is exacerbated by hindsight bias. When a 
company fails (or simply has deeply disappointed shareholders), it will 
inevitably appear that managers were not acting in the shareholders’ interests, 
even if they were. In fact, because shareholders are residual claimants who 
may hold fully diversified portfolios of securities, maximizing profit for 
shareholders often requires significant risk-taking. Thus, ironically, companies 
that are engaged in shareholder wealth-maximizing, risk-taking activities may 
wind up in financial distress. On the other hand, companies that are pursuing 
strategies that primarily serve the interests of workers, such as expanding only 
to increase market share or acquiring other companies in unrelated fields to 
reduce risk, may never become insolvent. However, these strategies often do 
not maximize value for shareholders.  
II. AN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE: HOW TO ADVISE THE CLIENT
The prior discussion raises an interesting question about Dodge v. Ford 
itself. If I am correct that the profit maximization rule is so difficult to 
enforce as a practical matter, then how did the court in Dodge v. Ford manage 
to enforce it? After all, as Professor Stout accurately (though perhaps a bit 
bluntly) observes, unlike the Delaware courts, the Michigan courts are not 
12. See id. 
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exactly known for their expertise or sophistication in matters of corporate 
law.13 Michigan is indeed “a distant also-ran in the race between and among 
the states for influence in corporate law.”14 This is true not only in 
comparison with Delaware, but even in comparison with other states, such as 
California, New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Virginia.  
The reason that the Michigan Supreme Court held against Mr. Ford is 
simple. Ford gave them no choice when he asserted that he was pursuing 
some strategy other than wealth maximization for shareholders. As Professor 
Stout observes, Henry Ford did not acknowledge the validity of the minority 
shareholders’ claim that the corporation had fiduciary obligations to them. 
Rather, Ford “argu[ed] that he preferred to use the corporation’s money to 
build cheaper, better cars, and to pay better wages.”15
Henry Ford’s frank admission raises an important question. Where was 
Henry Ford’s lawyer when Mr. Ford was losing the case for himself by 
claiming no hint of an obligation to maximize shareholder value? Instead, Mr. 
Ford testified that he did not plan to make any dividend payments to the 
shareholders, convincing the court that the CEO had “the attitude towards 
shareholders of one who has dispensed and distributed to them large gains 
and that they should be content to take what he chooses to give.”16
A fascinating thing about Dodge v. Ford, and a compelling reason why it is 
an excellent teaching vehicle, is how easy it would have been for Mr. Ford to 
have won this case. Suppose Mr. Ford simply had gotten on the stand and 
testified (contrary to the truth, apparently) that he was keenly interested in 
maximizing value for shareholders. Suppose further that Mr. Ford took the 
position (as many CEOs have done) that, in his view, the best way to benefit 
the shareholders was to increase the market share of the business, and that 
reducing the price of cars was critical to his strategy of expanding the 
company. Also suppose that Mr. Ford took the eminently reasonable position 
that the company required loyal, experienced, and skilled workers to succeed, 
and that his plan to raise wages was necessary to accomplish this end.  
In sum, suppose that Mr. Ford simply had testified that his plans were 
consistent with the goal of profit maximization for shareholders. As the court 
observed in Dodge v. Ford, while corporations are “organized and carried on 
primarily for the benefit of the stockholders[,] . . . [t]he discretion of the 
directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end . . . .”17 In 
13. See id. at 166–67. 
14. Id. at 167. 
15. Id. at 165 (paraphrasing Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. at 671). 
16. Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. at 683. 
17. Id. at 684. 
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other words, Dodge v. Ford itself stands for the proposition that as long as the 
goal of the corporation is profit maximization, the directors have virtually 
unfettered discretion to choose the strategies to be employed to that end, 
which the court described aptly as “the infinite details of business.”18  The 
court specifically noted that the issues in the case, including (but presumably 
not limited to) employee wages, working hours and conditions, and product 
pricing are at the discretion of the directors.19 Consistent with common 
contemporary corporate practice, the court even suggests that declining to 
distribute dividends is fine, so long as the retained earnings are used to benefit 
the stockholders and not devoted to “other purposes.”20
In other words, what mattered in this case was not what Mr. Ford did, 
but what he said he was doing. Mr. Ford said that he was putting the interests 
of other constituents ahead of the interests of the shareholders. If he had lied
and said that his motivation was to maximize profits rather than to benefit 
workers and other non-shareholder constituencies, he would have won the 
case. The court acknowledges that the problem in this case was Mr. Ford’s 
frank articulation of the motives for his behavior and that of his directors, as 
he had attempted to argue that directors’ motives are irrelevant, as long as 
their actions “are within their lawful powers.”21
The court did not dispute that the actions taken by the directors were 
within their lawful powers. The problem the court had was that the directors 
attempted to justify their actions by claiming that they were motivated by a 
desire to benefit some constituency other than the shareholders. If Henry 
Ford had decided to articulate a different, shareholder-centric motivation for 
his behavior, he would have prevailed in this litigation. 
This raises the interesting question of how Mr. Ford’s attorneys might have 
better counseled their star witness. The rules of professional responsibility are 
clear. Lawyers have a duty to do everything possible to prevent a client from 
lying, and they must not knowingly call any witness who plans to lie while 
testifying.22 Lawyers who believe that a client is going to give untruthful 
testimony are required to take remedial measures, including disclosure to the 
tribunal if necessary, rather than permit such conduct in the proceeding.23
Mr. Ford’s lawyers had a responsibility not to allow him to lie on the 





22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2003). 
23. Id. at R. 3.3(b). 
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Thus, this case tells us something important about the practical ramifications 
of the rules of professional conduct, as they may well have been outcome-
determinative. Unless Mr. Ford lied about the motivations for his actions, he 
would lose the case.
Suppose, however, that Mr. Ford’s lawyers had said something like the 
following: “We cannot advise you to lie. In fact, our professional 
responsibilities as lawyers require that we insist that you tell the truth. Be 
aware, however, that if you insist on testifying that your motivations in 
formulating your dividend policy and other corporate strategies are to benefit 
your employees and society rather than your company’s shareholders, you are 
going to lose this case. On the other hand, if you can honestly testify that you 
think that what you are doing is in the overall best interest of the Ford Motor 
Company and its shareholders, then you should say so, and you will be able to 
do as you please regarding salaries, expansion of production facilities, and 
product pricing. The plaintiffs will have no chance of winning this case if you 
testify that you are doing what you are doing to maximize value for your 
company’s shareholders.” 
Mr. Ford, not being a complete idiot, would undoubtedly get the point if it 
was presented to him in this fashion, and undoubtedly it would have been. The 
more vexing question is whether Mr. Ford’s lawyers should have advised Mr. 
Ford that the outcome of the case would depend on the way he characterized 
his own motives. This is one of the things that make Dodge v. Ford so intriguing. 
Because there is no sure way to tell what Mr. Ford’s real motives were, it is 
impossible to know whether he was lying when he testified, and an unethical 
lawyer could have advised Mr. Ford to lie without fear of repercussion.  
It would be wonderful to know what advice Mr. Ford’s lawyers gave him 
before he testified so helpfully for the plaintiffs who were suing him. Perhaps 
this case represents the apogee of legal ethics in American law practice. 
Perhaps Mr. Ford was not told what the implications of his testimony might 
be. Or perhaps Mr. Ford was advised about the implications of his testimony, 
and, out of arrogance or pride, decided to tell the truth anyway, in spite of his 
lawyers. We will never know, but speculating certainly is fun. 
III. RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
Professor Stout challenges the proposition that shareholders are the sole 
residual claimants in the firm.24 Professor Stout thinks that by showing that 
shareholders are not the sole residual claimants in a company, she has 
24. See Stout, supra note 1, at 173. 
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somehow shown that profit maximization for shareholders is a bad idea. In 
my view, it is here that Professor Stout begins to err.  
The basic problem is that Professor Stout’s analysis reflects more than 
just a rejection of the goal of shareholder wealth maximization contained in 
Dodge v. Ford (and elsewhere, including the ALI’s Corporate Governance 
Project and Delaware’s corporate law jurisprudence). It also appears to reject, 
at least implicitly, the observation that the modern corporation is a nexus of 
contracts.25 Because the firm is a voluntary organization in which 
relationships are characterized by the contracts that define the firm itself, it 
would seem that rights, obligations, and power within the firm should be 
allocated according to contract. Seen from this perspective, there is a simple 
explanation for what the firm does—or, perhaps more accurately, what the 
firm should do. The corporation acts (or should act) so as to perform its 
obligations under the myriad contracts it has with its various constituents. 
At least to me, the default rule is clearly that the corporate contract calls 
for the firm to maximize value for shareholders consistent with its other 
obligations under the law, as well as to employees, suppliers, customers, and 
other firms and individuals with which the firm is in contractual privity. The 
goal of profit maximization for shareholders is the law, but it is only a default 
rule. If the shareholders and the other constituents of the corporate enterprise 
could agree on some other goal for the corporation, then the law clearly 
should not interfere. Thus, to the extent that Dodge v. Ford is articulating a 
default rule, I believe that the decision was and is correct. To the extent that 
Dodge v. Ford purports to reflect a mandatory rule, however, I agree with 
Professor Stout that the opinion is not a correct articulation of the law.  
Professor Stout claims that “[n]ot too long ago, it was conventional 
economic wisdom that the shareholders in a corporation are the sole residual 
claimants in the firm, meaning that shareholders are entitled to all the 
‘residual’ profits left over after the firm has met its fixed contractual 
obligations to employees, customers, and creditors.”26 Professor Stout is right 
to observe that shareholders are not the only residual claimants in the firm. It 
would be impossible to prevent workers, customers, suppliers, and other 
constituencies (including local communities) from benefiting in many 
“residual” ways when the corporation flourishes, and to prevent these 
25. For the origins of this concept, see Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 
386 (1937); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310–11 (1976) (noting 
that most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of 
contracting relationships among individuals). 
26. Stout, supra note 1, at 173. 
Virginia Law & Business Review 3:177 (2008) 186
constituencies from being harmed when the corporation is in distress. 
Contracting parties often benefit in various ways when their counter-parties 
flourish and suffer when their counter-parties fail.  
Thus, shareholders are not distinguished by being the only corporate 
constituents with residual claims to the profits of the firm. What distinguishes 
shareholders is that they are the only claimants to the cash flows of the firm 
whose only economic interests in the firm are residual. This, as Professors 
Easterbrook and Fischel pointed out long ago, explains a peculiar feature of 
corporate law that Professor Stout conveniently ignores: shareholders, as 
residual claimants, almost always have exclusive voting rights in the firm.27
Professor Stout also goes on to claim that “modern options theory 
teaches that business risk that increases the expected value of the equity 
interest in a corporation must simultaneously reduce the supposedly ‘fixed’ 
value of creditors’ interests.”28 This claim is more or less correct, subject to a 
couple of important qualifications. First, it is worth noting that under certain 
conditions, shifting to new projects can increase the value of shareholders’ 
interests without reducing the value of the creditors’ interests even where 
business risk increases.
For example, suppose that a firm with $20 in debt is thinking of shifting 
from Project 1, which has an expected value of $54, to investment 2, which also 
has an expected value of $54. Project 1’s expected value of $54 is based on the 
assumption that there is a 20% chance the firm will earn $20, a 60% chance that 
the firm will earn $50, and a 20% chance that the firm will earn $100 during the 
relevant time frame.29 Project 2 also has an expected value of $54, based on the 
assumption that there is a 40% chance the firm will earn $20, a 20% chance that 
the firm will earn $50, and a 40% chance that the firm will earn $90 during the 
relevant time frame.30 Each of these projects provides an expected value of $20 
for the firm’s fixed claimants and $34 for the firm’s equity investors.31
The risk of these two projects can be assessed by comparing the standard 
deviation of the two projects. Because the standard deviation of the second 
project (66.15) is higher than that of the first project (65.05), the shareholders 
might prefer the first project to the second, depending on a host of factors. 
27. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON.
395 (1983). 
28. Stout, supra note 1, at 173. 
29. (.2 × $20) + (.6 × $50) + (.2 × $100) = $54. 
30. (.4 × $20) + (.2 × $50) + (.4 × $90) = $54. 
31. With both projects creditors have a 100% chance of being repaid the funds that are owed 
to them. Project 1’s shareholders have an expected return of $34, as (.2 × $0) + (.6 × $30) 
+ (.2 × $80) = $34. Project 2’s shareholders also have an expected return of $34, as (.4 × 
$0) + (.2 × $30) + (.4 × $70) = $34. 
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Corporate law provides no guidance as to which of these two projects should 
be selected, even where shareholder wealth maximization is the goal, because 
the second project offers both greater upside potential and greater risk to the 
shareholders. It is clear, however, that the choice between Project 1 and Project 
2 is a matter of complete indifference to the firm’s fixed claimants, because the 
creditors will be repaid in full regardless of which of the two projects is chosen.  
Thus, contrary to Professor Stout’s assertions, finance theory also teaches 
that increasing business risk does not always result in a diminution in the 
value of a firm’s fixed claims. There are many business decisions that increase 
the value of a firm’s equity claims without decreasing the value of the firm’s 
fixed claims. For example, suppose that the firm is offered a third project. 
Pursuing this project also entails the firm selling $20 in fixed claims, but this 
project has an expected value of $58. Project 3’s expected value of $58 is 
based on the assumption that there is a 40% chance the firm will earn $20, a 
20% chance that the firm will earn $50, and a 40% chance that the firm will 
earn $100 during the relevant time frame.32 This project provides an expected 
value of $20 for the firm’s fixed claimants but a $38 expected return for the 
firm’s equity investors.33
Just as the fixed claimants were indifferent between Project 1 and Project 
2, they are also indifferent among the firm’s choices of Project 3 or Projects 1 
or 2. Professor Stout offers no reason for why a rational fixed claimant would 
pay anything for the rights to participate in the decision about which of these 
three projects to pursue.  
Of course, Professor Stout might respond to this criticism by pointing 
out that there are plenty of other projects that the firm might pursue that 
transfer wealth from the fixed claimants to the equity claimants by increasing 
the standard deviation of the expected returns in such a way as to lower the 
probability that the creditors’ claims will be repaid in full. This is true. 
Creditors, however, can fully protect themselves from this risk by contract. 
Not only can creditors refuse to extend credit, or charge very high rates of 
interest to compensate themselves for the perceived risks of an investment, 
they can also bargain for protections such as the conversion rights, which 
allow them to convert their claims from fixed claims to equity claims, or put 
option rights, which permit them to sell their fixed claims back to the firm 
under contractually specified conditions.  
32. (.4 × $20) + (.2 × $50) + (.4 × $100) = $58.  
33. Project 3’s creditors have a 100% chance of being repaid the funds that are owed to them. 
Project 3’s shareholders have an expected return of $38, as (.2 × $0) + (.2 × $30) + (.4 × 
$80) = $38. 
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In other words, there are business decisions that simply do not involve 
the fixed claimants, because there are business decisions in which the fixed 
claimants do not have a stake. Because shareholders’ only claims are residual 
claims, all decisions made by the firm that affect either risk or return affect 
the shareholders.  
Most tellingly, while Professor Stout recognizes that business risks that 
increase the expected value of the equity interests may reduce the value of a 
firm’s fixed claims, she does not appear to recognize that the reverse is true. 
Business risks that increase the value of a firm’s fixed claims (that is, by 
reducing risk) reduce the value of a firm’s equity claims. For example, 
suppose that a firm embarked on Project 4, in which there was a 90% chance 
that the firm would make $100 during the relevant time period, but a 10% 
chance that the firm would go bankrupt and be able to return only half of the 
$20 owed to creditors. This investment would have an expected value of $91, 
including $72 for the shareholders and $19 for the creditors.34 Suppose 
further that the firm was choosing between this project and an alternative 
Project 5 with a 100% chance of returning $50 at the end of the relevant 
investment period. This alternative project would have a value of $20 for 
creditors but only $30 for the shareholders.35
It is true that if equity claimants gained control of a company that was 
pursuing the project with the $50 expected value (100% chance of $50), they 
would quickly shift the firm’s resources to the alternative project that reduced 
the value of the fixed claims by nine percent, or from $100 to $91. It is also 
true, however, that if the fixed claimants somehow obtained control of a 
company that was pursuing the project with the $91 expected value, they would 
quickly steer the firm in the direction of the project with the $50 expected 
value, which would increase the expected value of their claims from $19 to $20.  
Thus, what we actually know by combining corporate finance with the 
Coase Theorem is the following. First, one cannot determine whether fixed 
claimants’ interests are being sacrificed for the benefit of equity claimants or 
whether the reverse is happening unless one knows the baseline 
understanding of the parties when they made their initial investments. If the 
parties invested thinking that the firm would pursue Project 4, a shift to 
Project 5 would benefit the firm’s shareholders and harm the firm’s fixed 
claimants. On the other hand, if the parties invested thinking that the firm 
34. (.1 × $10) + (.9 × $100) = $91. Project 4 will have an expected return of $19 for creditors, 
as (.1 × $10) + (.9 × $20) + (.4 × $80) = $19. It will have an expected return of $72 for 
shareholders, as (.1 × $0) + (.9 × 80) = $72. 
35. 1.0 × $50 = $50. This Project will have an expected return of $20 for creditors, as 1.0 × 
$20 = $20. It will have an expected return of $30 for shareholders, as 1.0 × $30 = $30. 
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would pursue Project 5, a shift to Project 4 would benefit the firm’s fixed 
claimants and harm the firm’s shareholders. Without knowing the original 
understanding of the parties, we simply do not know who is ripping off whom.  
Second, from a societal perspective, legal rules should be organized to (a) 
cause the firm to internalize fully the costs of its operations; and, having done 
that, (b) pursue the projects that maximize the overall value of the firm. Thus, 
as between Project 4 and Project 5, the firm clearly should pursue Project 4, 
which maximizes economic output and societal wealth. Fixed claimants can 
easily be compensated for moving from Project 5 to Project 4, because 
Project 5 is only worth $50 ($20 for the fixed claimants and $30 for the 
shareholders), while Project 4 is worth $91 ($19 for the fixed claimants and 
$72 for the shareholders). Thus, both classes of claimants, fixed and residual, 
could be made better off by a move from Project 5 to Project 4, accompanied 
by a side-payment from the equity claimants to the fixed claimants of some 
amount greater than $1 but less than $42.36
Third, while fixed claimants may sometimes have an incentive to 
maximize the value of the firm, shareholders, as the residual claimants, always 
have the incentive to maximize the value of the firm. Thus, shareholders, not 
creditors, should be put in charge of making the marginal decisions that affect 
the overall value of the firm (subject, of course, to the ability of the fixed 
claimants to protect themselves through the contracting process). 
These are the default rules in corporate law, subject to modification by 
the various participants in the corporate enterprise, of course. The single, 
uniform measure of wealth to be maximized is the overall value of the firm, 
and the shareholders are in the best position to do this, subject to the 
possibility of making side bargains with other constituencies.  
CONCLUSION
As a narrow legal matter, Dodge v. Ford stands for the proposition that if a 
CEO testifies that he and his board were engaging in certain actions for 
reasons unrelated to maximizing shareholder value, they would lose a lawsuit 
challenging those actions, especially if they exhibited indifference to the 
interests of those shareholders.37 On the other hand, if the CEO engaged in 
36. On the other hand, there is no way for the fixed claimants to pay the shareholders to 
move from Project 4 to Project 5, because the gains to the fixed claimants ($1) are much 
smaller than the losses to the equity claimants ($61).  
37. For a modern version of Dodge v. Ford, see Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 
A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. 1986), another case whose outcome turns on the CEO’s motivation 
for taking a particular corporate action and in which the CEO lost merely because he 
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precisely the same actions but claimed that doing so was for the purpose of 
maximizing shareholder value, they would win the same lawsuit. 
 In other words, I agree with Professor Stout’s essential claim that the 
corporate law principle of wealth maximization for shareholders as articulated 
and enforced in Dodge v. Ford is a rule that is hardly ever enforced by courts. 
Professor Stout and I disagree, however, about the reason why this is the 
case. Professor Stout attributes the lack of other cases like Dodge v. Ford to the 
fact that the legal rule articulated in the case is not good law.38 Perhaps this is 
true, but I do not think so.  
In my view, the holding in Dodge v. Ford is attributable to the fact that the 
rule of wealth maximization for shareholders is virtually impossible to enforce 
as a practical matter. The rule is aspirational, except in odd cases. As long as 
corporate directors and CEOs claim to be maximizing profits for 
shareholders, they will be taken at their word, because it is impossible to 
refute these corporate officials’ self-serving assertions about their motives. 
Nonetheless, fully understanding the futility of the holding in Dodge v. Ford
can provide an interesting and important lesson about the ability of corporate 
law to provide much of value to investors.  
Dodge v. Ford is a great metaphor for the complex and gargantuan mass of 
corporate law that has been piling up on the legal landscape at both the state 
and federal level since the beginning of the twentieth century. While these 
rules undoubtedly enrich the platoons of corporate lawyers who plan for and 
litigate with corporations, they do not do much for shareholders. 
implied (indeed expressed) “threats” to oppose certain transactions that “could be 
determined by the board to be in the best interests of all the stockholders.” Id. at 278. 
38. See Stout, supra note 1, at 165. 
